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Case No. 7735

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
NORTHCREST, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and A:ppellantJ

-vs.WALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, a corporation, as executor
of the last will and testament and
estate ·of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who
was sometimes known as L. R.
THOMAS, deceased, JOHN LIVINGSTON THOMAS and ADELAIDE R. THOMAS, his wife; and
GERTRUDE THOMAS GARDNER,
Defendants and Resp,donents,

HUGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmarried; WALTER WRIGHT; and
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee,
Defendants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
NORTHCREST, I~C., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

"TALKER BAXK & TRUST CO~I
PAXY, a corporation, as executor
of the last will and testament and
estate of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who
was sometimes known as L. R.
THO~IAS, deceased, JOHN LIVINGSTON THO~IAS and ADELAIDE R. THOMAS, his wife; and
GERTRUDE THO~IAS GARDNER,
Defendants and Respdonents,

Case No.
7735

HUGH L. THOMAS, JR., unmarried; \VALTER WRIGHT; and
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee,
Defendants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEniENT OF FACTS
A.

Preliminary Statement

The brief of appellant does not fully reflect
all of the essential facts of this case, and for that reason
we deem it necessary to set forth a statement of facts
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In full. "'\Ve cannot hope to match the brief of the appellant in dramatic appeal, but we shall attempt to compensate for this deficiency with a straightforward comprehensive and unvarnished recital of all of the relevant
facts of the case.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to quiet
its title to two quarter-quarters sections of land described
as follows:
The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter
and the ~ ortheast quarter of the Southwest
quarter of Section 29, Township 1 North, Range
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. (R. 1, 2).
Plaintiff's exhibit "A" well illustrates the lands
involved.
For purposes of this law suit, it is necessary to
treat the lands in question as three separate tracts by
reason of the fact that plaintiff's claims to the various
tracts do not all arise out of the same chains of title.
The first tract is the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 29, and will hereinafter be referred to as the East 40. The second tract consists of
the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, except
a strip about 20 rods north and south by 30 rods east
and west, in the southwest corner thereof. The second
tract will be hereinafter referred to as the west tract.
The third tract is the small southwest corner of the
west tract above described, and is hereinafter referred
to as Capitol Heights Second Filing.
Capitol Heights Second Filing is subdivided into
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Lots and Blocks. Certain of these lots were never owned
by any of the defendants and the plaintiff's title thereto
is not in dispute. These lots a.re known and designated
as Lots 1 to 8 inclusive, Block 1, Lots 2 to 7, inclusive
and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive, Block ~' and Lots 2 to 6
inclusive and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive, Block 2, and Lots
2 to 6 inclusive and Lots 15 to 21 inclusive in Block 3,
Capitol Heights Second Filing. (R. 106, 107). On plaintiff's Exhibit ~-\_, these lots are shown in white. They
are referred to in appellant's brief as the "white lots"
and we shall employ the same terminology. The other
lots in Capitol Heights Second Filing a.re shown on
Exhibit A in yellow, and in these lots the respondents
claim an interest. We shall follow appellant's termjnology and refer to these lots as the "yellow lots."
The Court's Decree quieted plaintiff's title in and
to the white lots, and to an undivided one-third interest
in and to all of the rest of the property in suit, subject
to the probate of the estate of Lucie R. Thomas, deceased. The Court also quieted the title of defendant
John Livingston Thomas to an undivided one-third
interest and the title of the defendant Gertrude Thomas
Gardner to an undivided one-third interest each to all
of the lands in suit except the white lots, subject to the
probate of the Estate of Lucie R. Thomas, deceased.
(R. 113-115). Appellant now concedes that the Court
was correct in awarding to each of John Livingston
Thomas and Gertrude Thomas Gardner, an undivided
one-third interest in the yellow lots, but contends that
it "·as error to award those defendants any interest in
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the b8.lanc8 of the property, and claims that plaintiff
should have been awarded title to the whole thereof.
(A:ppellant's brief, pp. 46, 50).
In view of the fact that title to the white lots is
not in anywise involved in this appeal, they may be
eliminated from further consideration, and hereinafter
in this brief, any reference to the land in suit will be
understood to exclude the white lots.
B.

CHRONOLOGY

All parties to this action derive their claims of
title from Lucie R. Thomas. (R. 27). It is undisputed
that on and before December 16, 1908, LucieR. Thomas
was the owner in fee of all of the lands in suit. (Ex.
11). On that date she executed a Warranty Deed to
H. H. Hempstead of San Francisco to the west tract.
The deed was subsequently recorded, not at the request
of the grantee, Hempstead, but at the request of the
grantor, Lucie R. Thomas, (Ex. F.) and Hempstead
never thereafter asserted any dominion ·over the land.
Notwithstanding the deed to Hempstead, Lucie
Thomas continued to treat the land as her own. On
February 4, 1910, she executed a Warranty Deed to
Tracy Loan & Trust Company covering b,oth the East
40 and also the west tract. (Ex. 11, Entry 38). The land
was subsequently reconveyed to Lucie Thomas by Tracy
Loan & Trust Company on September 17, 1915. (Ex.
11, Entry 44). The west tract was sold for delinquent
taxes assessed against Hempstead for the years 1910
and 1911, but was redeemed by Lucie Thomas on Jan-
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uary 10, 1915. (Ex. 11, Entries 40 and 42). On January
18, 191~, both the East 40 and the \rest tract \vere sold
to Spencer Clawson by ~\uditor's Tax Deed. (Ex. 11,
Entry 43). On January 1~, 1914, Lucie Thomas and her
husband, Hugh (not to be confused with defendant
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., Lucie's son), executed to Utah
SaYings and Trust Company, hereinafter referred to
as Utah Sa,ings, an instrument in the form of a Warranty Deed describing the east 40 and the west tract,
but excluding Capitol Heights, Second filing. (Ex. 11,
Entry 47; Ex. D). On January 19, 1915, Spencer Clawson, Quit Claimed to Lucie Thomas all of his interest
in and to the east 40 acres and the west tract. (Ex. 11,
Entry 49). K otwithstanding the deeds to Hempstead,
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., and Utah Savings, Lucie
Thomas always treated the land as her own. From
the years 1918 through 1934 inclusive, Lucie Thomas
paid the taxes on all of the lands in suit. The lands
were sold for taxes assessed for the years 1935 and
1936 and were later redeemed by Lucie Thomas. From
1938 through 1945 inclusive, Lucie Thomas again paid
all of the taxes on the lands in suit. (R. 100, 101). On
July 31, 1918, Lucie Thomas obtained a. Certificate of
\Yater Appropriation from the State Engineer for
use of water on part of the lands in suit. The certificate of water appropriation recites that the date of
appropriation was January 13, 1909. (Ex. 11, Entry
52-53).
Willard R. Smith, a stockholder and director of
the plaintiff corporation and its treasurer, testified
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that in the summer of 1947, the plaintiff corporation
became interested in purchasing the lands in suit, having previously purchased adjacent lands. The plaintiff obtained an abstract of title to the lands in suit
and determined that Lucie R. Thomas was the owner
(R. 68, 69). On August 13, 1947, plaintiff wrote a
letter to Lucie Thomas who was then in Southport
Connecticut inquiring whether she was interested in
selling the lands. (R. 69, 79, 80; Ex. 9). Mrs. Thomas
never replied to the letter, but shortly thereafter, Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr., called on Mr. Smith and represented
that he was Lucie's son. (R. 70). Negotiations for
:purchase of the property commenced. (R. 70). Northcrest referred the matter to its attorneys for an opinion
and they advised that title to the lands in suit was in
either Lucie R. Thomas or Hugh L. Thomas, (the witness wasn't certain which), but advised that the title
was clouded by the record interests of Utah Savings
and Hempstead under the deeds hereinbefore described.
(R. 71). As a result of the negotiations between Northcrest and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., N orthcrest agreed to
purchase the lands in suit from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr.
for the sum of $2500.00, which was the full value of
the property. (R. 73). Hugh L. Thomas Jr. was paid
$1800.00 of the purchase price and the balance of $700.00
was withheld pending clearance of the title. (R. 74,
76). Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Smith arranged
to obtain a Quit Claim Deed to the lands in suit from
Utah Savings. At that time he \Yas advised by the
officers of Utah Savings, with whom he negotiated,
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that Utah Savings claimed no interest whatsoever in
the lands. (R. 72, 73). No consideration "·as given for
the execution of the Quit Claim Deed (R. 75). Smith
did not expect to obtain any title by virtue of the Quit
Claim Deed, but merely to clear the cloud. Likewise,
the interest of Hempstead in the premises was recognized by both Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and by Smith, as
merely a cloud. (R. 75).
Lucie Thomas died on or about July 5, 1948, leaving as her surviving heirs and devisees the defendants
John Livingston Thomas, Gertrude Thomas Gardner
and Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. (Ex. 6). Prior to this date
and on or about September 16, 1947, an instrument was
executed purporting to be a Warranty Deed from Lucie
R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., covering all of the
lands in suit. (Ex. B; Ex. 11, Entry 67). At the trial
the defendants produced evidence so overwhelmingly
strong that the signature on this deed was not that
of Lucie R. Thomas, that plaintiff now reluctantly, but
none the less effectually concedes that this signature
was not hers. Appellant does, however, contend that
this signature was adopted by Lucie and acknowledged
by her, notwithstanding that there is no evidence to
support the contention. On June 11, 1948, Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr. executed to the plaintiff a Warranty Deed
covering all the lands in suit. (Ex. 11, Entry 59; Ex.
C.). On December 16, 1947, plaintiff obtained from
Utah Savings a Quit Claim Deed to all the lands in suit,
except the yellow lots in Capitol Heights Second Filing.
(Ex. E; Ex. 11, Entry 64). Plaintiff later obtained a
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Quit Claim Deed fro.m Lucie Hempstead, the widow of
H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and also obtained a decree
quieting its title to the west tract as against the widow
and the personal representative of H. H. Hempstead.
The details of this transaction are more fully stated
hereafter.
Plaintiff's claims to tile to the lands in suit are
based upon three separate chains of title. Plaintiff
claims first, an undivided fee title to the east 40 acres
and to the west tract, and an undivided one-third interest in the yellow lots in Capitol Heights Second
Filing, by virtue of its Warranty Deed from Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr. Second, plaintiff claims title to the east
40 acres and to the west tract under its Quit Claim
Deed from Utah Savings; and third, plaintiff claims
title to the west tract under its Quit Claim Deed from
Lucie Hempstead 'and under its decree quieting title
to said tract of land as against Lucie S. Hempstead
and against the personal representative· of the Estate
of H. H. Hempstead, deceased. We shall treat these
separate claims seriatim.
C.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER HUGH
L. THOMAS, JR.
The validity of :plaintiff's claim under its deed
fro.m Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., depends upon the validity
of the purported deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr., dated Sept. 16, 1947, and covering all
of the 1ands in suit. If this purported deed was a valid
conveyance to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., then the claim of
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the plaintiff is valid and it is entitled to a deeree quieting its title to all of the lands in suit. If, howeYer, the
purported deed from Lucie Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas,
Jr., was not a Yalid eonyeyance, but \Yas a forgery, ~as
claimed by the respondents, then the claim of the plaintiff is without merit and the only interest which plaintiff would have obtained under its deed from Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr., would be an undivided one-third interest
in the lands in suit, subject to the probate of the estate
of Lucie R. Thomas, deceased.
· It is interesting to observe that the plaintiff in
its brief admits that it obtained only an undivided onethird interest in ·and to the yellow lots. It would seem
to follow as a necessary consequence, that if the plaintiff obtained only an undivided one-third interest in
and to the yellow lots, it obtained no greater interest
in the rest of the lands in suit. All of the lands in suit
are described both in the purported deed from Lucie
Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and also in the deed
from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to the plaintiff. We do not
know upon what possible theory it could be contended
that the plaintiff derived any greater interest in the
east 40 acres and in the west tract, than it obtained in
the yellow lots. Having admitted that it acquired only
a one-third interest in the yellow lots, plaintiff would
seem to have admitted that it obtained no greater interest in the rest of the lands in suit. This alone would be
sufficient to defeat plaintiff's claim under Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr. However, the evidence received at the
trial of the case conclusively shows the purported deed
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fr01:1 Lucie R. Thomas, to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to be
a forgery and therefore to be wholly nugatory.
It is now admitted that the signature on the deed
from Lucie Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was not
the signature ·of Lucie Thomas. The evidence is equally
clear that this signature was never acknowledged or
adopted by Lucie Thomas as her own. Marguerite B.
Clayton, the notary public, who purportedly took the
acknowledgment of Lucie R. Thomas on the deed, testified at the trial that Lucie Thomas did not appear
before her, either on the date shown on the deed or at
any other time, and did not acknowledge the signature
to be hers. (R. 59, 60). The defendant Hugh L. Thomas,
Jr. (who defaulted), was subpoenaed to testify on behalf of the respondents and he testified that his mother,
Lucie Thomas was never in Salt Lake City in 1947,
except during the latter part of December of that year,
and therefore, could not have acknowledged the signature on the deed. He stood upon his constitutional
privilege against self incrimination and refused to answer any further questions. (R. 81).
D.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER UTAH
SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY

Mr. McGee, an officer of Utah Savings was called
and testified on behalf of the respondents. The testimony of McGee is produced in full in appellant's brief
and need not be repeated here. The purpose of calling McGee was to identify the defendants' Exhibit 8,
which is a series of three loan cards, part of the records
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of Ftah Savings. The cards, together with Mr. McGee's
explanation thereof, show conclusively that on January
12, 1914, Lucie Thomas and her husband borrowed from
Utah Savings the sum of $1400.00. The cards also show
that the loan, together "ith interest thereon was fully
repaid on K ovember 3, 1915. Exhibit 8 also shows that
the borrowers, Lucie Thomas and her husband, Hugh,
executed a 'Yarranty Deed as security for the loan. On
the loan card the deed is merely described as W.D.
['Yarranty Deed] to part of Section 29, Township 1
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The

vVar-

ranty Deed from Lucie Thomas and her husband Hugh
to Utah Savings and Trust Co., under which plaintiff
claims title to the east 40

~acres,

and the west tract, is

dated January 12, 1914, which is the same date as the
loan. The consideration recited in the deed is $1400.00,
which is the exact amount of the loan.
As above pointed out, the property was never thereafter claimed by Utah Savings, but was always claimed
by Lucie R. Thomas and treated as her own. No other
deed from Lucie Thomas to Utah Savings covering any
other lands in Section 29, was ever recorded. (R. 101).
In light of these facts and circumstances, the conclusion is irresistable that this purported Warranty
Deed was not a deed at all, but was intended by both
of the parties thereto to be a mortgage and security for
the loan, and was treated by both as such.
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E.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM UNDER
H. H. HEMPSTEAD

Plaintiff also claims title to the west tract by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed from Lucie S. Hempstead, the
widow of H. H. Hemrpstead, deceased, (Ex. G) and by
virtue of a decree quieting its title in and to the west
tract, as against Lucie S. Hempstead and 'as against
Arthur P. Lakin, administrator with the will annexed of
the Estate of H. H. Hempstead, deceased. (Ex. H).
The quiet title suit against the Hempsteads was originally commenced on November 7, 1950, (after commencement of the case at bar) and Lucie Hempstead
was the sole defendant. The complaint alleged that title
to the premises was in the plaintiff, that the defendant
claimed some interest in and to the lands adverse to
the plain tiff and that such claim was null and void.
The complaint was signed by Frank Armstrong one
of the attorneys for the plaintiff, and by signing the
complaint he certified that in his opinion there were
good grounds to support the allegations therein contained. Rule 11, U.R.C.P. Subsequently on about November 29, 1950, the plaintiff obtained a Quit Claim
Deed from Lucie Hempstead to the west tract for which
it paid a consideration of $25.00. Thereafter, the attorneys for the plaintiff procured the appointment of
Arthur P. Lakin as administrator with the will annexed
of H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and they amended their
complaint in the quiet title suit by joining the personal
representative of H. H. Hempstead as a party defend-
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ant. (Ex. 10). Thus the attorneys for N orthcrest represented both the plaintiff, N orthcrest and the defendant representatiYe of the Estate of H. H. Hempstead,
and assun1edly on their adYice the personal representatiYe of the Hempstead estate defaulted.
It should be obserYed here, that if plaintiff is in
·good faith when it states that it would be \villing to
rely on its title derived from Utah Savings (as it does
state at page 6 of its brief), it can hardly be in good
faith in asserting that it obtained a good title from the
Hempsteads. The claim under Utah Savings as to the
west tract, could not have any validity, if there is any
merit to the Hempstead claim, since the Hempstead
deed antedates the deed to Utah Savings.
Both Hempstead and Lucie Thomas being dead
at the time of the trial it was impossible to show the
exact nature of the transaction between Lucie Thomas
and H. H. Hempstead. However, from the fact that
the deed was recorded by Lucie Thomas, the grantor,
rather than by Hempstead, the grantee, (who was a
resident of San Francisco), and from the fact that
Hempstead never thereafter asserted any interest in
the land and from the fact that Lucie Thomas continued to treat the land as her own, it is almost necessary to infer that the deed from Lucie R. Thomas to
Hempstead was never intended to convey :any beneficial interest in the land. In any event, if Hempstead
ever obtained any title to the west tract, such title was
suh:-:f•quently extinguished by virtue of the Auditor's
Tax Deed of the west tract to Spencer Clawson.
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F.

SU:MMARY

In summary, it may be said that Lucie Thomas
was the owner of all of the lands in suit prior to 1908
and at that time she executed a Warranty Deed to H.
H. Hempstead to a portion of the lands in suit, that
such deed probably never conveyed any title to Hempstead but if it did so, such title was later extinguished
by an Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Clawson, covering the same lands; that on January 12, 1914, Lucie
Thomas executed an instrument in the form of a Warranty Deed to Utah Savings, covering the East 40 acres
and the West tract, but said instrument was never intended as a conveyance, but merely as a mortgage; that
the loan secured thereby was later fully paid and satisfied and that on the payment of such loan, Utah Savings never had any further interest in the land and
never claimed any; that thereafter Lucie Thomas was
the sole owner of said lands and continued as such to
the date of her death, paying all of the taxes thereon;
that the purported deed from Lucie Thomas to Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr., was a forgery and was of no force or
effect whatsoever; that the plaintiff, N orthcrest, dealt
with Hugh Thomas Jr., in good faith, believing that
Hugh Thomas, Jr. had the title to the land; that the
plaintiff, N orthcrest knew that the interests of both
Hempstead and Utah Savings were merely clouds and
treated them as such; that the Quit Claim Deed obtained
by the plaintiff from Utah Savings was not in derogation of the Thomas title, but in affirmation thereof;
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that the plaintiff having discovered that it had been
defrauded and that it obtained no title whatsover to
the lands in suit, except whatever interest Hugh might
have had by right of inheritance from his mother, has
sought by various devices to throY{ its loss upon the
defendants, John Livingston Thomas and Gertrude
Thomas Gardner, both of whom are entirely innocent
of any wrongdoing in the matter and who in equity and
good conscience should not be deprived of their rights
of inheritance by reason of the wrongdoing of a third
person with whom they never dealt.
POINTS TO BE ARGUED
1. The respondents established by evidence which
was clear, convincing and unequivocal that the deed
from Lucie R. Thomas to Utah Savings & Trust Company was intended as a mortgage.
:2. The evidence by Utah Savings & Trust Company that the deed from LucieR. Thomas to Utah Savings & Trust Company was intended as a mortgage
was competent and relevant and was properly received
by the Court.

3. The testimony of the notary public denying
that Lucie R. Thomas acknowledged the purported deed
from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was
competent and relevant and was properly received by
the Court.
4. Respondents proved by a clear preponderance
of the evidence that the purported deed from Lucie R.
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Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was a forgery and
said instrument was nutagory and void and of no force
and effect.
5. Plaintiff's claim to title under H. H. Hempstead
is wholly without merit.
6. Plaintiff's claims to title under H. H. Hempstead and Utah Savings & Trust Company were obtained in affirmation and not in derogation of the
Thomas title and the plaintiff is estopped to claim title
under either.
7. Lucie Thomas established a title by adverse
possession, good as against the claims of either H. H.
Hempstead or Utah Savings & Trust Co.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE RESPONDENTS ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE
WHICH WAS CLEAR, CONVINCING AND UNEQUIVOCAL
THAT THE DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO UTAH
SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WAS INTENDED AS A
MORTGAGE.

Appellant commences its argument with the assertion that it would be willing to stand on its title obtained under its Quit Claim Deed from Utah Savings.
This bold assertion fails to ring true in view of the fact
that appellant devotes a considerable portion of its
brief in attempting to uphold its position under two
other chains of title. While we can well understand
why appellant would not place much faith in its claims
under Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and H. H. Hempstead, its

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
claim under Utah Savings is equally frail and must
fall when confronted with cold facts and clear reasoning.
Appellant concedes, as well it must, that a deed absolute on its face may be shown to be intended only as
a mortgage, and we assume that appellant also concedes that when such a showing is made, courts of
equity ·will give effect to the intent of the parties and
treat the jnstrument as a mortgage. The cases cited
in app€llant 's brief are ample authority for this proposition.
We agree with the appellant's statement that the
question in every case is the intention of the parties,
and ·we have no quarrel with the proposition that the
mutual intentio:o. of the parties must be proved.
The evidence outlined in our Statement of Facts
clearly shows the intention of both parties, that
is of Lucie R. Thomas and her husband, Hugh Thomas
on the one hand, and Utah Savings on the other, that
the instrument executed by the Thomases to Utah Savings in the form of a Warranty Deed was intended by
both of the parties thereto as a security transaction
only, and that it was treated by both parties as such.
It is apparently the position of the appellant that this
intent of the parties can be shown only by conversations of the parties at the time of the execution of the
instrument. However, the law of evidence is not so
:poverty stricken. In determining the intent of the
parties, and whether or not a mortgage was intended,
the Court may and should consider the existence of a
continuing obligation to pay a debt; relative values;
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contmnporaneous and subsequent acts and declarations
of the parties to the instrument; the form of written
evidence of the transactions; the relationship of the
parties, and the purposes to be accomplished. Corey
vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 Pac. (2d) 940; Thornley
Land and Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, (Utah), 143 Pac.
(2d) 283,
The record quite conclusively establishes that there
was an existing and continuing obligation on the part
of the Thomases to pay a debt to Utah Savings which
was evidenced by the loan cards of the bank. It fully
appears from the testimony of E. R. McGee set forth
in full in appellant's brief, and from Exhibit 8, part of
the records of Utah Savings, that prior to January 12,
1914, the Thomases borrowed money from Utah Savings, that a portion of this loan was repaid, and that
on January 12, 1914, an additional amount was borrowed, making the total amount of the obligation
$1400.00. The date of this transaction is identical to
the date of the Warranty Deed from the Thomases to
Utah Savings, and the consideration recited in the deed
is $1400.00, the exact amount of the loan. Further, the
records of the bank show that a Warranty Deed covering part of the lands in Section 29, was executed by
the Thomases, as security for the loan. While the bank
records do not S'Pecifically identify the land covered in
the security deed, as being the same identical lands as
those described in the deed under which appellant
claims, there would seem to be little doubt that the
lands referred to were the same. The identity of date
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and consideration can hardly be charged to coincidence.
:Moreover, it appears from the abstract of title received
in evidence, that Lucie R. Thomas thereafter continued
to treat the land as her own, mortgaging it, conveying
it, paying the taxes thereon and securing a certificate
of water appropriation.
..:-\fter the amount of the indebtedness was paid,
Utah Savings never asserted any further interest in
the land. At the time of its Quit Claim Deed to the
appellant, Utah Savings admitted that it claimed no
interest in the land.
In view of all these facts and circumstances, the
conclusion is irresistable that it was the intent of both
parties that the deed should be treated as a mortgage,
and both parties did in fact treat the deed as a mortgage.
Counsel for the appellant has suggested no other conclusion which would be consistent with all of the above
mentioned facts and circumstances and we are unable
to conceive of any. Counsel has suggested that the
Thomases might have executed another Warranty Deed
conveying other lands in Section 29, as security for the
loan transaction, and counsel specifically suggests that
Lucie Thomas owned the yellow lots in Section 29 as
well as the lands described in Exhibit D. The record
does not show when Lucie Thomas acquired title to the
yellow lots and it would be mere speculation to assume
that she was the owner of those lots or any other lands
in Section 29 at the time of this conveyance. It would
be even more speculative ·to assume that Lucie Thomas
executed two deeds to Utah Savings. The record is
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clear that only one deed was ever recorded, and there
is no evidence whatsoever, that even suggests that another deed was executed by Lucie Thomas to Utah
Savings. The finding of the Court must be based on
evidence, not upon speculation and conjecture. There
is no evidence to support appellant's thesis. The trial
Court arrived at the only conclusion possible under the
evidence adduced.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE BY UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY THAT THE DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO
UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WAS INTENDED
AS A MORTGAGE WAS COMPETENT AND RELEVANT
AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT.

Plaintiff contends that it was incompetent for Mr.
:McGee to testify with respect to the records of Utah
Savings. This contention seems to be based upon a
false premise. Appellant cites the general rule that a
grantor may not, after parting with his title, make
statements or admissions in disparagement of his title
to the prejudice of his grantee. No such problem is
here involved. It was not contended by respondents
that McGee knew of his own personal knowledge the
facts with respect to the deed from the Thomases to
Utah Savings. Mr. McGee, as an officer of Utah Savings, having access to its records, was called merely to
identify the records and to explain the notations thereon.
The records speak from the date they bear and not from
the date of trial, and were properly received as statements in disparagement of its title by a grantor made
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at a time when it was vested with whatever interest
it ever held, and long prior to the time it 1parted with
its title. The rule with respect to such declarations is
well stated in the annotation in 1 A.L.R. at page 1240
where it is said:
"The well-settled rule of la'IY is that the declarations against his own title of a former owner
of property, either real or personal, made while
in the possession thereof, are admissable not
only against himself, but also against those claiming u.nder him, but that a derogatory statement
of a grantor made after parting with title, being
hearsay, and not having the required guaranty
of truth, is not competent evidence against the
transferee, or those claiming under him, at least,
in the absence of fraud or collusion." (Italics
ours.)
See also the statement of the rule in 20 Am. J ur. pages
502, 503 and 516, Evidence, Sees. 593, 593.1 and 604:
Page 502, Sec. 593 :
"The declarations of a third per'Son are admissable against a party whenever privity of
estate exists between the declarant and the party,
the term 'privity of estate' generally denoting
in this respect a succession in rights. The declarations of the privity in estate are deemed in
law to be the declar·ations of the party himself.
Thus, whenever a party claims under, or in the
interest or right of, another, the de~larations of
such other person pertaining to the subject of
the claim are admissible against him.''
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Page 503, Sec. 593.1 :
"It should be observed that the st·atements
of :parties to an instrument at and after the
execution thereof are admissable where the issue is whether the instrument was an absolute
deed or mortgage.''
Page 516, Sec. 604:
"On the other hand, it is held that whenever
·a party clai1ns under or in the interest or right
of another, the declarations of such other person
pertaining to the subject of the claim are admissible against him. Accordingly, a declaration of
a former owner in the nature of an .admission
against interest, is, as to real estate at least,
admissible against his successors in title to show
the real char·acter of the possession of the declarant or the title under which he held, provided
the matter is one which may be proved by parol
evidence and the declarant posessed a proprietary
interest at the time he made the statement. It is
not necess-ary to call the former owner as a witness to prove the statement; and any person
may testify thereto.''
See also Abbott v. Walker, 204 Mass. 71, 90 N.E.
406.

Not only were these records of Utah Savings properly received as admissions against interest of a former
owner, binding upon his privity, (appellant), but they
were also admissible as records made in the regular
course of business of Utah Savings. The rule with respect to this is well stated in 20 Am. Jur. 881, Evidence
Sec. 1403, follows:
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''Independent of, and in addition to, the shopbook rule of the common law and statute, which
admits only the account books of a party to a
cause or proceeding, is ·another rule which is not
confined to books of account or to records made
by a party to an action, under \Yhich entries cr
memoranda n1ade by third parties in the regular
course of business, under circumstances calculated to insure accuracy and precluding any motive of misrepresentation, are admissible as rprima
facie evidence of the facts stated. The truthtelling habits of such business records make them
admissible, irrespective of the unavailability of
the witness. ~Iodern statutes of recent development have provided for ~admissibility of certain
business books and memoranda.''
The documents were also admissible under still
another rule that is, the ancient document rule, these
records having been in existence for more than 30 years.
Only by keeping the true facts from the Court can
appellant hope to prevail. To its credit, it must be said,
that it has exercised real ingenuity in attempting to
devise arguments and to raise obstructions to the presentation of the full facts to the Court. However, trials
of law suits being essentially factual investigations,
it is the policy of the law to receive in :proof all evidence
which reasonably tends to prove or disprove the ultimate facts in issue, except as such evidence is declared
to be inadmissible under one of the well established
exclusionary rules. Appellant has pointed to no exclusionary rule \vhich would n1ake the testimony of
McGee or Exhibit 8 inadmissible. The false issue of
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disparaging declarations being made after the grantor
has parted with interest is patently without merit and
the evidence of McGee is entitled to be weighed and
considered the same as that of any other disinterested
witness.
POINT III.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC DENYING THAT LUCIE R. THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE
PURPORTED DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO HUGH
L. THOMAS, JR., WAS COMPETENT AND RELEVANT
AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT.

In seeking to establish its title under Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr., the plaintiff is again confronted with the
necessity of supressing the facts, and only by so doing
can it hope to prevail upon this theory. It has always
been the contention of the respondents, that the deed
from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., was a
forgery. It is elementary of course, that a forged deed
is utterly void and conveys nothing to the grantee although he may be an innocent purchaser for value and
without notice of the forgery. Long Co. v. Kenwood 85
Ut. 524, 39 Pac. (2d) 1088, and cases there cited; also
16 Am. Jur. 452.
At the trial of this cause, respondents produced
such overwhelming evidence that the signature upon
the deed was not that of Lucie R. Thomas, that appellant now ·belatedly and reluctantly concedes that the signature on the deed is not hers. However, appeUant has
the temerity to assert that the notary's certificate of
acknowledgment stands as strong evidence that Lucie
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Thomas acknowledg-ed the deed as her own a.ct, and that
it was incompetent for the notary public to impeach her
certificate of acknowledgment. In making this contention, appellant seeks to give to the certificate of acknowledgment a degree of sanctity far above that to
which it is entitled.
"\Vhile asserting that the weight of authority is to
the effect that a notary may not impeach his certificate
of acknowledgment, appellant cites only two cases in
support of its position and both of those cases are readily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar,
as will be more fully pointed out, hereafter.
Appellant has failed to recognize that there are two
types of fact situations which may occur and which are
controlled by different legal principles. In the first
situation the person purporting to execute the deed or
other instrument, may actually be in the physical pres~
ence of the Notary Public, but may not make a valid
acknmYledgment, due to physical infirmity, mental incapacity, ignorance, or failure of the notary to follow
the forms prescribed by the law. In situations of this
sort, many of the Courts hold not only that the notary
may not impeach his certificate, but that the certficate
is absolutely conclusive of the facts therein stated.
HmYeYer, in the second class of cases, where the person purporting to execute the deed or instrument never
appears before the notary public at all, the authorities
are virtually unanimous in holding that the purported
certificate of acknowledgment is a nullity and has no
force or effect whatsoever and may be impeached by
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parol evidence. It has been held in a great num·ber of
cases that the officer taking the acknowledgment may
testify in impeachment of his own certificate, and the
trend of authority and the better reasoning is in support of this view.
For an excellent discussion of the foregoing views
see Grider vs. American Freehold Land Mort~age Co.
99 Ala. 281, 12 So. 775, where it is said:
"It must be regarded as settled by the great
weight of authority that when the grantor or
mortgagor appe·ars before the officer and makes
an acknowledgment of the execution of the instrument, which is duly certified by the officer
to have been made in conformity to law, the
.certificate is conclusive of the truth of all the
facts therein certified, and which the officer was
by law authorized to certify, until successfully
as·s·ailed for duress or fraud in which the grantee
or mortgagee participated, or of which he had
notice at the time of parting with the consideration. The taking and certifying of the acknowledgment are held in many of the cases to be of
a judidal nature; and when the officer has jurisdiction so to speak, by having the party acknowledging, and the instrument to be acknowledged
before him, and enters upon and exercises this
jurisdiction, the parties will not be allowed to
impeach the truth of the facts which he is required by law to certify, and does certify, in the
·absence of fraud or duress, as above stated.

*

*

*

'' ... we must realize that the question we are
called upon to decide is by no means free from
difficulty. We know the absolute and implicit
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faith and trust ·which, in practice, purchasers
of real estate repose, and must necessarily repose, in the form,al and regular certificates of
authorized officers, authenticating the regular
and legal execution of conveyances, and the disastrous consequences which may flow from a
rule which would allow those certificates to be
questioned, and set aside ,against vurchasers who
have parted with valuable interests in reliance
upon them ; yet on the other hand we perceive
the manifest injustice of a rule which would deprive one- of his property, without his knowledge or consent, upon the mere baseless fabrication of another ... Upon due consideration, we
are of the opinion that the better rule, and the
one sustained by the weight of authority is that
when there has been no appearance before the
officer, and no a1cknowledgment at all made, it
may be shown in disproof of the officer's certificate, even against bona fide mortg·agees and
purchasers. We approve the rule as it is stated in
1 American & English Enc. Law. P 160 1T 6:
'When there is no appearance before the officer, his false certificate of acknowledgment is
void; but when there is an appearance and acknowldegment of it in some manner, then the
official certificate is conclusive of every fact
appearing on its face, and evidence of what
passed at the time of the acknowledgment is inadmissible to impeach the certificate, except in
case of fraud or imposition, and where knowledge or notice of the fraud or imposition is
brought home to the grantee.'" (Italics ours).
Another excellent discussion is set forth in the
case of Pickens vs. Knisely, 29 W. Va. 1, 11 S. E. 932.
The Court there said:
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"In all the cases the struggle has been to
protect the married woman in her right of property on the one hand, and the innocent purchaser,
who parted with his money for her land, on the
other, and to uphold the rights of land owners,
who must necessarily rely on the correctness of
the records of land-titles for their protection
... it has been uniformly held that, as regards
an innocent purchaser of the land of a married
woman, the certificate of her acknowledgment
of the deed by an authorized officer is conclusive of the facts which are therein stated. The
principle, it is contended, applies to every case
where the acknowledgment has been certified
by an officer authorized to take it, whether the
married woman ever acknowledged it or not.
But I have found no case where it has been held
that if it cleal'ly appeared, by 1l·roper parol evidence, that the married woman never, in fact,
appeared before the officer to acknowledge the
deed, :and the certificate contains all the requirements of the law, just as though she had in fact
appeared before the officer, the deed would operate to devest [sic] her estate, even in favor of
an innocent purchaser; but we have cited two
cases where :lt has been held that under such
circumstances her estate could not be devested
[sic]. It does seem to me that strong as may be
the claims of innocent purchasers, who have been
thus impnsed upon by the gross fraud and collusion of a wicked husband rand a justice, who
had no regard for the rights of property, yet the
claim of an innocent wife, who, without the least
fault of hers, has thus been the victim of such an
attempted spoliation of her land, makes a much
stronger appeal to the Court.

*

*

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
'·It seen1s to us that it is adn1issible to hear
the evidence of a justice who took the acknowledgment of a married woman to prove that she
neYer did in fact appear before him to acknowledge a deed, although he has certified that she
did.,,
See also the language of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas in the case of Hall vs. Mitchell, 175 Ark.
641, 1 S.,V. (2d) 59 where the court said:
''A :proper acknowledgment is an es·sential
part of the execution of a conveyance of land,
and it is competent for the grantor to show the
falsity of a certificate of acknowledgment. Where
the grantor does not acknowledge the deed and
the officer makes a certificate that the grantor
did appear, the act of the officer is without authority of law and void. No one can claim that an
estate in land can be divested by forgery, and
every one must be subject to the risk of forgery
by officers authorized to take acknowledgments.
Miles v. Jerry holds in accord with above and
further holds that forgery need only be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. Miles v.
Jerry, 158 Ark. 314, 250 S.W. 34 and Wilson v.
Biles, 171 Ark. 912, 287 S.W. 373."
The rule is summarized in 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) at
pages 1170 and 1171 as follows:
"Even in those states where the certificate
is held to be conclusive of every fact appearing
on the face of the certificate which the officer is
by law authorized to certify, ·and where it is held
that evidence of what passed at the time of the
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acknowledgment is inadmissible to impeach the
certificate except in case of fraud or imposition,
the certificate may always ·be impeached by proof
that the party did not in fact appear before the
officer certifying to the acknowledgment, nor
otherwise acknowlege the instrument. Michener
v. Cavender, 38 Pa. 334, 80 Am. Dec. 486; Le Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532, 40 Am. St. Rep.
81, 35 · Pac. 1054; Grider v. American Freehold
Land Mortg. Co. 99 Ala. 281, 42 Am. St. Rep. 58,
12 So. 775; Meyer v. Gossett 38 Ark. 377; Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 579, 66 Am. St. Rep. 920,
45 S.W. 796; Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 321,
24 Am. Rep. '699. ''
And at page 1173 of the same annotation it is said:
"But it is always admissible to show that
grantors in alleged deeds or mortgages never
actually appeared before the officer purporting
to have taken their acknowledgments, and that
they made no acknowledgment at all, even as
against a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee without notice, and relying on the acknowledgment.
This situation is analogous to a judgment void
for want of jurisdiction. There is a wide distinction between this and the admission of an
appearance before the officer, but a denial of
the occurrence of certain rna terial incidents recited in the certificate.''
For other authorities to the same effect see Donahue
vs. Mills, 41 Ark. 421; Peoples Gas Co. vs. Fletcher, 81
Kan. 76, 105 Pac. 34, Robertson vs. Burnham, (Tex.)
12 S.W. (2d) 991; and Moore vs. Bragg 212 Ala. 481,
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103 So. 45:2; See also 1 An1. J ur. 378, where the rule is
declared as follows :

"On the other hand, it shocks the conscience
to suppose that property owners may be defrauded merely by false personation or by procuring the collusion of an unscrupulous officer.
A balancing of the conveniences leads to the conclusion tlzat where there was no appearance before the officer and no acknowledgment at all
made, this may be shown in disproof of the certificate, even against innocent persons who have
relied upon the recitals thereof. There is a wide
distinction between this and the admission of
an a;ppearance before the officer, but a denial of
the occurrence of the material incidents recited
in the certificate. In the 1atter class of cases it
is generally held that the recitals in the certificate can only be impeached for fraud or imposition, and then only if the knowledge or notice of
the fraud can be brought home to the grantee.
The rights of property are too sacred to ~allow
them to be swept away without the knowledge
of the owner. Furthermore, caveat emptor.''
(Italics ours.)
Utah is committed to the above rule. In the case
of Tarpey vs. Desert Salt Co., (Utah) 14 Pac. 338, this
court said:
"A deed may be acknowledged and admitted
to record. One object of the acknowledgment is
to entitle the deed to be recorded. But the record
is only prima fa·cie evidence of t:he faiCts therein
stated. Law Utah 1884 p. 363, sees. 1177, 1178.
The certificate of acknowledgment is itself only
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prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
It is not conclusive, amd may be rebutted. Comp.
Law Ut~ah, p. 255, sec. 9, (625). Further proof
may become necessary in support of the certificate, or to show its falsity." (Italics ours).

Though appellant asserts that the weight of authority does not permit a notary or certifying officer to impeach his certificate, most of the c.ases which we have
been able to discover on this question have permitted
the certifying officer to impeach his certificate. The
trend of authority is definitely in this direction. See
1 Am. Jur. 380 where it is said:
"The trend of authority, however, is in favor
of admitting any evidence that may have a tendency to prove the truth, and a more liberal rule
permits the officer to be called as a witness and
compelled under oath to state the true facts of
the transaction so far as he can remember them,
whether he acted under mistake, misapprehension, or in collusion with the party to be benefited by taking the acknowledgment.''
The only two cases cited by appellant, (First National Bank v. Glenn. 10 Ida.. 224, 77 P. 623 and Woodridge v. Woodridge (W. V a.) 72 S.E. 654), do not support the rule for which appellant contends. In both of
those cases it was clear that the party purporting to
have executed the acknou·ledgment did in fact appear
before the officer, whereas in the case at bar, the testi-

mony is that Lucie R. Thomas never did appear before
Mrs. Clayton to acknowledge the deed. The courts held,
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in those two cases, that it was not competent for the
notary to impeach his certificate. In the case of the
First Ka tl. Bank of Hailey v. Glenn, supra, (quoted
in appellant's brief at page 34) the language which purports to support the appellant's position is merely dicta.
In that case the notary actually testified in support
of his certificate. The language was unnecessary to the
holding of the court and should not be persuasive on
this court. \Ye quote the following language from that
case:
"In this case, however, the evidence of the
notary was as much in support of the certificate
as in contradiction thereof. He testified to explaining to the witness the contents of the instrument, and its purpose :and effect, and that,
while she did not appear to understand it very
well, she told him it was all right with her if it
was with her husband, and that whatver he did
or said was all right with her. He also testified
that after going over the matter, making a full
explanation as he could, and conversing with her
about it, he considered she had m~ade a sufficient
acknowledgment of the execution of the instrument and that she was satisfied therewith, and
that he felt justified in attaching the certificate
of acknowledgment thereto.''
We quote below from a few of the many decisions
which have authorized the courts to receive the testimony of the officer in impeachment of his certificate of
acknowledgment.
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Qualls vs. Qualls, 196 Ala. 524, 72 So. 76:
"Neither public policy nor other rule of our
court would prevent the witness Searcy [notary]
in a controversy between the parties to the purported deed to deny its execution, to explain the
presence of his affixed seal of office, and certificate of acknowledgment, and to state the true
facts, in a court of justice, when such a reputed
conveyance is collaterally attacked.''
Garth v. Fort, 15 Lea (83 Tenn.) 683:
''. . . any evidence going to show a want of
the invalidity of the privy examination is competent, and we know of no rule excusing an officer from stating such facts as will go to show
a failure on his part to do his duty.''
Louden v. Blythe, 16 Pa. 532:
''The justice who takes and certifies the acknowledgment of the wife to a deed is acting
judicially . . . We cannot cast into oblivion our
knowledge that this duty is often, by justices of
the peace, :and sometimes by other judicial officers, as has been said, 'hurried over almost in
the presence of the husband.'
''Can it be that such acknowledgments are of
so high and sacred a character as to import absolute verity, and cannot be assailed by parol
evidence 1''
Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375, 18 N.W. 113:
''In the present case, when the notary swore
he did not know the person whom he certified
he knew, he deprived his certificate of all the
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fo'u.ndation on 1rhich the la1c allows the presumption to be raised, and the subscribing witness
who testified to his own ignorance destroyed
also the presun1ption that in some cases attend
the action of such witness in the absence of suspicion. It would be very absurd to allow a certificate such zceigllt a.s is claimed for it here when
the notary himself contradicts his own statements and shows its want of truth. It is not a
very satisfactory state of things when a forgery
can gain even presumptive credit from the examination of an officer who has certified, without foundation for his action." (Italics ours).
Campbell vs. Campbell, (Wash.) 263 Pac. 957:
"As we indicated in Ehlers v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., supra, the act of the officer
in certifying to the acknowledgment may result
in taking the property of one person and vesting
it in another, and that such an officer, no matter
how prudent he is, may be deceived. It would
seem necessarily to follow, therefore, that the
person wronged by such an act should not be deprived of any testimony which would tend to
correct the wrong, and it can be that the testimony of the officer taking the acknowldegment
would be the most persuasive testimony that could
be produced upon the fa~t. The weight that is
to be given to his testimony will of course depend upon the circumstances, but the triers of
the fact in such an instance, as in all other instances of controverted fact, must be relied upon
to give the testimony its due weight. The reason
usually given for excluding the testimony of the
officer, is that it is contrary to public policy.
But to us this is a mistaken view. If the question
rests upon this ground, it must be because the
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certificate is conclusive, and none of the cases,
even those that adhere most tenanciously to the
rule of disqualification, goes to this extent."
(Italics ours).
Mays vs. Pryce, et al, 95 Mo. 603, 8 S. W. 731:
''The notary who was most conversant with
the facts recited in his certificate, was of all
persons the most competent to testify on that
subject, whether in support or in impeachment
of the verity of its statements. The only rule
that could possibly close his mouth as a witness
would be one making this certificate absolutely
conclusive, one that would preclude him or anybody else from calling in question the verity of
that certificate. In the argument of the learned
counsel for the plaintiff, much is said in support
of the proposition that such ought to be the
rule, but it having been long settled the other
way, it must follow from the rule as now established that the notary is as competent as any
other witness to testify touching his knowledge
of the facts recited in the certificate, the verity
of which under that rule is a legitimate subject
of inquiry; a corollary recognized in the cases
cited, supra, in nearly all of which the notary
testified, sometimes in support of, and sometimes
in impeachment of, his certificate and his competency was never questioned. There ·was no
error in admitting the testimony of the notary.''
For other cases to the same effect see Fisher vs.
Bollman, 258 Ill., App. 461; McDowell vs. Stewart, 83
Ill. 538; :McCurley v. Pitner, 65 Ill. App. 17; Comings
vs. Leedy, 114 Mo. 454, 21 S.\Y. 804; Truman vs. Lore,
14 Ohio State, 144; Jackson vs. Humphry 1 Johns,
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(X.Y.) 498: Kranichfelt Y~. Slattery, 12 l\fisc. 96, 33
X.Y.S. :27: \Yinn Y~. Itzel, 123 \Yis. 19, 103 N.W. 220;
DaYis YS. :J[onroe, 187 Pa. St. 334; Roach vs. Francisco,
138 Tenn. 337,197 S.\Y.1099; Tatum vs. Goforth, 9 Ia.
247, Pereau YS. Frederirk, 17 Neb. 117, 22 N.W. 235;
In re Hylbert, 26 Fed. (2d) 672; Wolverine Oil Co. vs.
Parks, 79 Okl. 318, 193 Pac. 624; Effenberger vs. Durant,
37 Okla. 445, 156 Pac. 212.
~\ppellant has failed to rite to the court so much as
a single case which supports its view that a notary
public or other officer is not competent to impeach his
certificate where the person purporting to have acknowledged the instrument never in fact appeared before
him at all. There may be a few cases which support this
position but such cases are in the minority and are not
supported by sound reasoning or by any principle of
public policy.
At pages 33 and 34 of its brief, appellant advances
three reasons in support of the rule for which it contends. These reasons are as follows:
1. That it is against public policy to permit a
notary public to testify in impeachment of his certificate of acknowledgment.
2. That the certificate of acknowledgment being
the solemn declaration of an officer in his public and
official capacity and under his hand and seal, is more
likely to be true than the memory and testimony of the
witness years afterwards.
3. Persons who have dealt and :paid in reliance
on the truth of the certificate should be protected
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against the contradictory statements made afterwards.
With respect to the first reason advanced, appellant has not pointed out wherein it would be against
public policy to permit the notary to testify in impeachment of his certificate, except as it may be against
public policy under the third reason. We are not unmindful, that persons dealing in and with property and
parting with valuable consideration in reliance upon
the public records should be protected to the fullest
possible extent. However, an even higher consideration of 1public policy, universally recognized by the
courts, dictates that no person shall be deprived of his
property rights by the connivance of forgers, thieves
and dishonest or careless public officers. Rights in
property may not thus be lightly swept R\Yay, even
thoug'h bona fide purchasers for value, may be caused
to suffer thereby. This is a case where one of two innocent parties must suffer for the wrong doing of a
third party. It is universally held that under such circumstances the one who dealt with the wrongdoer, (in
this case the appellant,) must bear the loss. It is a
fundamental principle of property law, too well recognized to require citation of authority and subject only
to a few exceptions not applicable here, that a person
can convey no better title than he holds. He who purchases a defective title must bear the loss.
Contrary to appellant's contention, there are strong
considerations of public policy in favor of permitting
the notary to testify in impeachment of his certificate.
The notary will in many cases be the person most con-
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versant with the facts, and therefore the one best able
to testify with respect thereto. In many cases, as in
the case at bar, the notary may be the only witness
able to testify as to all of the facts surrounding the transsaction, and to deprive the parties of his testimony
would require the courts to perpetuate rather than to
correct a grievous wrong, and would result in depriving innocent owners of their property. It is settled
law in this state that the certificate of acknowledgment is only prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts therein stated, and the courts should not close
their eyes and ears to any evidence which may serve
to show the true facts and to rectify a wrong.
The second argument advanced by the appellant
in support of its contention that the notary should not
be permitted to testify in impeachment of his certificate, is one addressed to the weight rather than the
competency of the evidence. Whether or not the officer's testimony at the trial is more reliable than his
certificate must depend upon the facts of each case.
The factors to be considered should include the time
elapsed from the date of the certificate to the date of
trial; the interest, if any, of the notary public in the
outcome of the litigation; whether or not the officer
was a party to the wrongdoing; whether or not the officer was acquainted with the person purporting to
have made the acknowledgment; the manner and demeanor of the officer upon the witness stand and all
of the other circumstances surrounding the transaction,
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which might tend to affect the reliability or credibility
of the testimony.
POINT IV.
RESPONDENTS PROVED BY A CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PURPORTED
DEED FROM LUCIE R. THOMAS TO HUGH L. THOMAS,
JR., WAS A FORGERY AND SAID INSTRUMENT WAS
NUGATORY AND VOID AND OF NO FORCE OR EFFECT.

As pointed out heretofore, a certificate of acknowledgment executed by a notary public, or officer, where
no person actually appeared before him, is a nullity and
of no force and effect. When this fact is established
the certificate is deprived of all credibility and of all
weight in evidence. See 1 Am J ur. 376, where it is said:
''A grantor in an instrument of conveyance
who never at any time appeared for the purpose of acknowledging the instrument is not
bound in any wise by the recitals in the certificate of acknowledgment attached by a notary
public. The notary is without authority or jurisdiction to attach any certificate whatever. In
such a case, the jurisdiction of the officer not
having been invoked, his utterance is a nullity
and his certifica·te has no evidentiary force: whatever, in favor of or against ·anyone." (Italics
ours.)
We again invite the Court's attention to the quotations set forth under Point III in the cases of
Louden v. Blythe, McCurley vs. Pitner, Camp vs. Carpenter and Campbell vs. Campbell, particularly as they
deal with the weight to be accorded a certificate of
acknowledgment, under such circumstances. We also
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invite the Court's attention to the following additional
cases:
Roach Ys. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S. W. 1099
where the court said:
"'It is unwise to lay down a fixed rule to determine the weight of evidence required to overturn the officer's certificate. The ascertainment
of truth is the purpose of all judicial inquiry,
and 1ch enever the court is satisfied that the truth
has been reached, it would be folly to .refuse to
accept it because of some arbitrary rule respectthe weight of evidence ... Cases may often arise,
and if an inflexible rule as to the weight of testimony required should be adopted they doubtless
would rise, in which no one but the defendant
landowner could testify to impeach the certificate of the notary, as in the case of a forged
certificate. It could not be said, if the court
were satisfied of the truth of the complainant's
story, that he must lose his land because some
official was willing to forge a certificate to a
deed showing that he had conveyed it.'' (Italics
ours.)
The case of People vs. Geibel (Cal.) 208 Pac. (2d)
743, was a criminal prosecution for forgery. In that
case the evidence showed that the signature on the
deed had not been signed by the person purporting to
sign the same. The notary public was called as a witness and she was unable to testify as to the identity of
the individual whose ·acknowledgment she took. (Note
that she did not testify 1positively that the person who
purported to have signed the instrument did not personally appear before her and acknowledge the same.)
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The Court held in that case that the evidence was sufficient to support a criminal conviction of forgery. Thus
evidence weaker than that in the case at bar (where the
notary testified positively that the person purporting
to acknowledge the deed did not appear before her,)
was held sufficient to support (i. e. to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt) a criminal conviction of forgery.
The court said :
"It is true, as stated by appellant, with reference to the genuiness of the signature of the
contract, that proof of acknowledgment by a
notary public is prima facie evidence of the
execution of the writing, but such a showing is
rebuttable and not conclusive. In the case at
bar, J\lrs. Berg, the notary, could not testify to
the identity of the individual whose acknowledgment she took except that she had been introduced to him as Clarence Clark by appellant.
While she testified as to the general appearance
of the individual, his approximate age and dress,
there was expert testimony by handwriting experts that decedent Clark did not sign the contract, and there was positive testimony that it
was typed on a typewriter which was not in
existence on the date of said contract. A certificate of acknowledgment being only prima facie
evidence, such certificate may be contradicted
by other evidence direct or indirect. Code Civ.
Proc. sec. 1833; Moore v. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270,
271, 272, 23 P. 318, 17 Am. St. Rep. 248; Le
Mesnager v. Hamilton, 101 Cal. 532, 533, 538,
35 P. 1054, 40 Am. St. Rep. 81. Courtney v.
Daniel et al., 124 Okl. 46, 253 P. 990, 995, 996.
The evidence was sufficient to justify the jury
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in concluding that notwithstanding the notarial
acknowledgment thereon, the contract was not
signed by Clarence Clark.''
In this case the trial court having heard the testimony of :Jirs. Clayton and having observed her demeanor on the witness stand, found that Mrs. Thomas
neYer in fact appeared before the notary. The judge
was well justified in so finding. In fact the evidence
would not admit of any other finding. Mrs. Clayton was
well acquainted with ~Irs. Thomas, having known her
for more than 15 years ; hence there would be no question as to her recollection or to the identity of the person :purporting to make the acknowledgment. Secondly,
Mrs. Clayton had nothing personally to gain by impeaching her certificate; on the contrary it must have taken
great courage on her part to admit in open court to
her wrong-doing in the matter. Further, by testifying
as she did ~Irs. Clayton made damaging admissions
against herself, and practically invited a civil ~action
on her bond for damages by the wronged party. See
Sec. 63-1-4 U.C.A. 1943. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that ~Irs. Clayton had anything to gain by
testifying as she did; r~a.ther, she testified contrary to
her own best interest. The trial judge observed her
demeanor on the stand and had an opportunity to determine whether she was a credible witness. There is
nothing in the record which in any way reflects discredit on her testimony except the fact that without
authority she did affix the certificate of ~acknowledg
ment to the deed; and this appears to have been done
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without any mala fides on her part. While it was wrong
on her part so to do, it was not a wrong involving such
moral turpitude on her part as to rob her testimony of
all credibility. Her wrong was one of laxity, and not
of fraud, deceit or malice.
Besides the testimony of Mrs. Clayton, there is the
uncontradicted testimony of the defendant, Hugh L.
Thomas, Jr. (who is not a party to this appeal) that
his n1other was not in Salt Lake City on the date that
the deed purported to have been acknowledged, nor was
she in Salt Lake City at any other time during 1947,
except at around Christmas time near the end of the
year. This testimony, coupled with the now undisputed
fact that the signature upon the deed was not that of
Mrs. Thomas, compels a holding that the deed was a
forgery and was never acknowledged by Mrs. Thomas
as her own act. Indeed there is no evidence in the record whatsoever that would warrant any different finding, and the forgery being established, it necessarily
follows that N orthcrest obtained nothing under its deed
from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., except his after-acquired
undivided one-third interest in the lands in suit.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM TO TITLE UNDER H. H. HEMPSTEAD IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT.

In a last desperate effort to salvage something from
this litig·a.tion, plaintiff claims title to the west tract
under chain of title derived from H. H. Hempstead.
It appears that in December, 1908, Lucie Thomas, who
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was then the undisputed owner, executed a 'Yarranty
Deed to the \Yest tract to H. H. IIempstead of San
Francisco, California. The deed was recorded, not at
the request of the g-rantee, but at the request of the
grantor. Thereafter, the grantee never exercised any
act of dominion over the property and never in anywise treated it as his own. Lucie R. Thomas continued
to treat the land as her own, mortgaging it, selling it,
and repurchasing it, paying the taxes thereon and securing a certificate of water appropriation. In 1912, the
land was sold by Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Clawson, who thereafter executed a Quit Claim Deed to the
same lands to Lucie Thomas. From that date forward,
Lucie Thomas was treated by the County as the owner
of the land. Taxes on it were assessed in her name and
were rpaid by her. vVhen N orthcrest became interested
in purchasing the land in 1947, it procured a title opinion from its attorneys wherein it appeared that there
was a cloud on the title by reason of the deed to Hempstead. Both Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and N orthcrest recognized that it was only ,a cloud and it wa.s agreed that
the cloud would be cleared as part of the agreement
between Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and the plaintiff.
The present action was commenced in August of
1950. For reasons known only to itself, N orthcrest did
not join Lucie Hempstead, the widow of H. H. Hempstead, nor the personal represent~ative of H. H. Hempstead as defendants in this action. Later it commenced
a separate quiet title action against Lucie Hempstead
on November 7, 1950. At that time the only title which
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N orthcrest had was whatever it obtained by virtue of
its deeds from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., and Utah Savings.
It was only by virtue of these deeds that it had any
standing ·whatsoever to commence or maintain the action. On November 29, 1950, Northcrest obtained a
Quit Claim Deed from Lucie Hempstead for which it
paid the nominal consideration of $25.00. We do not
know what representations were made to Mrs. Hempstead in order to obtain the Quit Claim Deed, but at
that time the lands covered by the Quit Claim Deed had
a f,air market value of somewhere around $1250.00.
After obtaining the Quit Claim Deed the attorneys
for the a;ppellant procured the appointment of Arthur
P. Lakin as administrator with the will annexed of
H. H. Hempstead, deceased, and then filed ~an amended
complaint, adding Lakin as personal representative of
the estate of Hempstead as an additional defendant.
Both of the defendants defaulted and N orthcrest obtained a Decree quieting its title to the west tract as
against the Hempstead interest.
We assume that the administrator of the Hempstead Estate defaulted on advice of counsel, who also
represented N orthcrest. If, at the time the quiet title
suit against the Hempstead interests was commenced,
there was in fact no merit to the Hempstead claim,
plaintiff gained nothing by virtue of the Quit Claim Deed
from Lucie Hempstead or by virtue of its decree quieting
title as against the Hempstead interests, and patently
there would be no merit to its present claim to title
under H. H. Hempstead. On the other hand, if there
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was any merit to the Hempstead claim, it would appear
that the personal representative of Hen1pstead was
guilty of a gross breach of duty in failing to defend the
quiet title suit. The net effect of this would be to perpetrate a fraud upon both the court and upon the creditors of the Estate of H. H. Hempstead. We cannot
believe that the conduct of the appellant in this matter
will appeal very strongly to a court of equity. Plaintiff either obtained nothing by virtue of its dealings
with the Hempsteads, as above outlined, or else whatever it obtained was obtained by conduct which was at
best open to severe criticism.
(a) The Evidence Shows that Hempstead Never
Acquired any Title by Virtue of his Deed from
Lucie R. Thomas.
As above indicated, Hempstead never asserted any
claim to the west tract, nor did he ever exercise any
act of dominion over it. This, coupled with the fact
that Lucie Thomas continued to treat the land as her
own, and that she paid the taxes thereon, and had always dealt with the property as her own, and the further fact that the deed was recorded at her request and
not a.t the request of Hempstead, who was a resident of
San Francisco, as appears from the deed, all point very
strongly to the fact that the deed was never delivered
to Hempstead and there was never any intent to convey title to him. Chamberlain vs. Larson, 83 Ut. 420,
29 Pac. (2d) 335; Woolley vs. Taylor, (Ut.) 144 Pac.
1094.
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(b) Any Interest 'Vhich Hempstead May Have
Acquired Under his Deed from Lucie R. Thomas
was Extinguished by the Subsequent Sale of
the property for Delinquent Taxes and Conveyance by Auditor's Tax Deed to Spencer Clawson.
The abstract of title received in evidence shows
that the west tract was sold for taxes and was conveyed to Spencer Clawson by Auditor's Tax Deed in
the year 1912. The period of redemption expired and
Hempstead made no effort to redeem the lands and
Clawson thereafter Quit Claimed to Lucie R. Thomas.
If Hempstead ever acquired any interest in the lands,
that interest was completely extinguished by the subsequent tax deed, and it follows as a necessary consequence that plaintiff obtained nothing by virtue of its
dealing with the Hempstead interests.
POINT VI.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO TITLE UNDER H. H. HEMPSTEAD AND UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY WERF.
OBTAINED IN AFFIRMATION AND NOT IN DEROGATION OF THE THOMAS TITLE AND THE PLAINTIFF
IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM TITLE UNDER EITHER.

The evidence is clear and undisputed that at the
time that the plaintiff entered into its agreement with
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., to purchase the lands in suit,
both of the parties to that contract recognized that there
were outstanding clouds on the title in the form of record
interests held by H. H. Hempstead and Utah Savings.
Both of tile parties likewise recognized that these were
only clouds and that they should be cleared in order to
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giYe the purchaser good marketable title, and it was
understood between the parties that such clouds would
be cleared. ~-\ppellant entered into possession of the
lands with this understanding. Thereafter, appellant
obtained a Quit Claim Deed from Utah Savings in affirmation of and in accordance with its contract with
Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. Long after this action was commenced, appellant further obtained a Quit Claim Deed
from Lucie Hempstead, widow of H. H. Hempstead
and a decree quieting its title as against Hempstead's administrator and his widow.
Plaintiff, having recognized the Thomas title, and
having gone into possession under the Thomas deed is
now estopped to assert an after acquired title as against
the Thomas title.
A case somewhat similar to the case at bar is Frink
vs. Thomas, (Ore.) 25 Pac. 717, where the court said :
"But defendant, having entered into the possission of this land under a contract of purchase,
will not be permitted to obtain an outstanding
title and assert it against the plaintiff. It was
expressly understood at the time the contract for
the sale of this land was made that the title was
unsettled, and that ~·laintiff would take such
steps as might be necessary, in order to perfect
the same, so as to comply with his agreement
with defendant. 'With this wnderstanding, defendant was allowed to go into possession of the land,
and having done so, neither equity nor good
conscience will permit him, by taking adv·arntage
of such possession, to obtain the title from the
general government in his own name for l1is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

own use and benefit. So that, if it should finally
be determined by the land department that the
land is not within the grant to the Oregon &
California Railroad Company, and a patent issued to defendant, the title will inure to the
benefit of plaintiff, and the defendant would
only be entitled to deduct from the purchase
n1oney the actual cost of obtaining such title from
the government. It is an established rule of
equity 'that if a vendee 'buys up a better title
than that of the vendor, and the vendor was
guilty of no fraud, he can only be compelled to
refund to the vendee the amount of money paid
for the better title. Equity treats the purchaser
as a trustee for his vendor, because he holds
under him, and acts done to perfect the title of
the former when in possession of the land inure
to the benefit of him under whom the possession
of the land was obtained, and through whom a
knowledge of a defect of title was obtained. The
vendor and vendee stand in the relation of landlord and tenant. The vendee cannot disavow
the vendor's title.' Bush v. Marshall, 6 How.
284; Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 294." (Italics
ours).
For other cases supporting the same rule see,
Ste!phens vs. Kesselburg, (Wash) 143 P. (2d) 289, Garvey vs. LaSh ells (Cal.) 91 Pac. 498, Finch vs. Noble,
49 Wash. 578, 96 Pac. 3, Flint v. Conner, 53 Cal. App.
279, 200 Pac. 37, Patreski v. Minzgohr, 144 Mich. 356,
108 N.W. 77, l\1isamore v. Berglin, 197 Ala. 111, 72 So.
347.
With respect to the Hempstead claim, plaintiff is
also estopped under another principle. Plaintiff through
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its attorneys commenced an action against the Hemp
steads alleging that the Hempsteads claimed an inter
est in the land; that the land was owned by N orthcrest
and that the claims of the Hempsteads were null and
Yoid and of no force and effect. On the basis of these
allegations, and evidence in support thereof, (assumedly
adduced), plaintiff obtained a decree quieting its title
as against the Hempsteads. Plaintiffs having come into
open court and having claimed and represented to the
court, that it was the true owner of the land, and that
the Hempstead claim was null and void, cannot come
into the same court and represent to the court that it
obtained a good title from the Hempsteads. If the
Hempsteads had no title to the lands when the quiet
title suit was commenced against them, then plaintiff
could not have obtained any title from them. On the
other hand, if the Hempsteads did have any title ,at the
time of the commencement of the quiet title suit, plaintiff has been guilty of fraud upon the court in obtaining a decree quieting its title as against the Hempsteads.
4

4

POINT VII.
LUCIE THOMAS ESTABLISHED A TITLE BY AD
VERSE POSSESSION, GOOD AS AGAINST THE CLAIMS
OF EITHER H. H. HEMPSTEAD OR UTAH SAVINGS &
TRUST COMPANY.
4

'1'

The trial court's Finding of Fact number 20 was
as follows:
"That LucieR. Thomas became the owner of
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tember, 1905, and from that date to the date of
her death on or about the 5th day of July, 1948,
she was in the exclusive possession of all of the
same under claim of right and as the owner
thereof and paid all taxes levied and assessed
against said property."
Plaintiff has made no attack upon this finding and
there is indeed no basis for any attack. The finding is
amply supported by the record. Particularly from the
year 1915 it is clear that Lucie Thomas was the owner
of all the lands in suit and as such was possessed thereof
and that she paid all the taxes thereon until the date
of her death. Any interests which either Hempstead
or Utah Savings might have had by virtue of their respect1ve deeds from Lucie Thomas, were extinguished
by this. period of adverse possession. Consequently
neither Utah Savings nor Hempstead had anything to
convey to N orthcrest, and N orthcrest obtained nothing
under its Quit Claim Deeds from either Lucie Hempstead
or fron1 Utah Savings.
CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks to establish a title by suppressing
the facts. If the evidence adduced at the trial was
properly received there can be no question but what
plaintiff has no title except as to an undivided onethird interest in the lands in suit. The evidence clearly
establishes and the court found, that the deed from
Lucie Thomas and her husband, Hugh, to Utah Savings
was intended by the parties thereto as a mortgage and
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was so treated: that the debt thereby secured \Yas fully
paid and satisfied, and that thereafter Utah Savings
had no interest in the land and claimed none, and so
advised the plaintiff and haYing no interest in the land
could conYey none; hence plaintiff acquired nothing
under its Quit Clailn Deed from Utah Savings.
The evidence is equally clear that the purported
deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Hugh L. Thon1as, Jr.,
covering the lands in suit was a forgery, and that Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr., obtained nothing thereunder. Having
nothing, he could convey nothing to N orthcrest. After
the date of that deed Lucie R. Thomas died and Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr. as one of her heirs and devisees, succeeded to an undivided one-third interest in the lands
in suit, subject however to the probate of his mother's
estate. Under the doctrine of after acquired title, appellant acquired an undivided one-third interest in lands
by virtue of its deed from Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., such
interest, however, being subject to the probate of the
estate of Lucie R. Thomas. This undivided one-third
interest we freely :admit.
The evidence shows that the deed fro·m Lucie R.
Thomas to Hempstead was never delivered to Hempstead and that he never acquired any interest thereunder. If any interest was acquired, it was extinguished
by subsequent tax deed to Spencer R. Clawson who in
turn Quit Claimed to Lucie R. Thomas. Lucie Thomas
also established a title by adverse possession against
both Utah Savings and H. H. Hempstead.

Further
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appellant is estopped to assert any title to said lands
under either Utah Savings or H. H. Hempstead.
The Judgment of the trial eourt was correct and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Respondents.
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